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Abstract
For the past two decades, derivatives provided the core financial innovation for
risk-management and risk-sharing activities. However, in the aftermath of the 2007-
2008 crisis, derivatives have started to receive, partly for good reason, an increasingly
bad press. The main purpose of this paper is to lay the foundations for a theoretical
framework in which systemic risk is centrally involved in the assessment of derivative
usage. We define an allocation to be efficient if it maximizes the Aggregate Sharpe
ratio of the economy, i.e. if it allows to finance the maximum amount of productive
investments while minimizing the overall systemic risk of the economy. We then say
that a derivative is socially efficient if it leads to an allocation having higher Aggregate
Sharpe ratio. We illustrate the applicability of our model by means of a qualitative
analysis of three types of derivatives, namely Plain vanilla, Asset backed securities and
Credit default-swaps.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
An efficient allocation of the unavoidable risks generated by the business activity of indi-
vidual agents is vital for the economic system. Insurance contracting and financial markets
attain to this crucial goal. Motivated by this objective, which often takes the form of an
attempt to achieve the simultaneous reduction of risk for all participants, financial risk-
bearing entities may enter into various kinds of formal risk-sharing agreements. Indeed, the
idea that enhanced risk allocation should result in real economic benefits for society as a
whole is deeply entrenched in political economic thought. To make just one notable example,
Irving Fisher remarked, back in 1906, that
[R]isk is one of the direst economic evils, and all of the devices which aid in
overcoming it – whether increased guarantees, safeguards, foresight, insurance or
legitimate speculation – represent a great boon to humanity. [25]
Driven essentially by sheer increase in financial innovation, the practice of risk allocation
performed by the financial system has rapidly evolved over the past few decades. Very
substantial efforts have been devoted to the design of institutions and products enabling
efficient risk sharing among individuals1. It is important to stress that innovation in the field
of derivative products has significantly increased both the efficiency and the complexity of the
allocation of risk. Today, market-based allocation of risk is primarily accomplished through
the use of derivative products and it is not an exaggeration to state that a considerable portion
of financial innovation over the last 30 years has come from the emergence of derivative
markets (see [1]).
This owes directly to the fact that, for at least a couple of decades, the benefits of using
derivatives, as well as of the associated market-based risk sharing model, appeared to be
many-sorted and unquestionable. First of all, derivatives have been widely believed to cater
for efficient risk management. Secondly, financial derivatives have been acknowledged an
important informational role as they could be used as price discovery tools (see, e.g. [21]).
1Representative examples can be found in [5], which also discusses a basic theory of risk sharing in an
economy with incomplete markets, and in [23].
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Finally, derivatives appeared to provide more liquidity to the markets and also to the general
economy.
For all those reasons, the trend in risk allocation has been marked by the securitiza-
tion and distribution of risk. As this process started to unfold, various types of risks were
originated, securitised, rated and allocated by different actors in the financial market. As
a fundamental consequence of all this, risks were transferred from the regulated sector to
unregulated one. Institutional supervisors welcomed this market-based risk sharing model
which, among other things, appeared to distribute risks away from a small number of large
and systematically important actors, to a large number of smaller size investors.
Things changed dramatically with the outbreak of the 2007-2008 global finiancial crisis
when a number of serious issues started to be raised with respect to the use of derivative
products. Paradigmatic cases have certainly been the instability of markets in the aftermath
Lehman Brothers’s failure and, to an even larger extent, the need of a bailout of AIG –
the largest insurance company in the United States at the time [33]. This much certainly
provided enough evidence to the effect that markets can, and sometimes do, fail to deliver the
expected risk management performances and the associated desirable social outcomes which
largely motivated the enthusiastic endorsement of financial derivatives2. Building on this
line of thought, a number of authoritative commentators [18, 32, 35] claimed that the global
economic and financial crisis was a direct consequence of specific failures of the market-based
risk sharing process.3
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a simple, yet in our opinion highly
flexible, framework for the characterization of what we refer to as socially efficient or coop-
2For instance, given their capital base and risk management policies, individuals choose their desired level
of market risk. However, in setting their level of market risk it is doubtful that individuals internalize the
systemic implications of the failure of their firms or the public cost associated with any implicit government
safety net.
3To worsen the outlook, recent empirical studies established either negative or no relation between deriva-
tive usage and firm value. For instance, [24] finds that in firms with greater agency and monitoring problems,
derivative usage has a significantly negative impact on firm value measured by their Tobin’s Q.
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erative derivatives.4 The main idea articulated across this paper is that a proper evaluation
of financial derivatives must take into account their impact on systemic risk.5 Hence, the key
desideratum for a socially efficient derivative consists in providing financial instruments to
the market to fund productive but risky projects with the minimum increase in the systemic
risk of the whole financial system. This is justified by the obvious observation that capital is
a limited resource and so is the capital available to cover for risky investments. Capital must
therefore be allocated efficiently toward the highest risk-adjusted productive investments.
While doing this, it should be borne in mind that not all risks are created equal, a fact that
should be taken into account when risks are diversified and spread across the economy. In
particular it is quite natural that those risks which relate to highly productive investments
should to be preferred to those bringing lower or zero contribution to the gross national
product.
Therefore, the leading intuition consists in defining efficient an allocation which allows
to finance the maximum amount of productive investments while minimizing systemic risk.
This simple approach gives us an opportunity to take into account a number of important
factors in the evaluation of the efficiency of a risk allocation, namely (i) the quality of
the diversification achieved by the individuals, (ii) the amount of funding of productive
investments and (iii) the degree of leverage. Notice that within this framework we can
explicitly model the systemic effects induced by the imprecise estimation of risk made by
the individuals. Indeed, financial innovations can significantly alter the precision of the
estimation of risk, a fact which has clearly important implications for risk allocation. This
adjustment of the subjective evaluation of risk is crucial if one aims, as we do, at modelling
individual decisions under uncertainty as opposed to risk – the situation in which true and
4Our proposed framework differs substantially from the optimal risk sharing one to be found in the
actuarial literature [11, 12], for our main concern is the characterization of a socially efficient derivatives.
5The importance of systemic risk is gaining increasingly recognition in the financial community. Several
definitions and several measures of systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors have been proposed
(see, e.g., [4, 9, 8, 27]).
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maximally precise evaluations of risks are given6.
The final steps in the construction of our model consist in defining an Aggregate Sharpe
ratio and identifying those channels through which a derivative may enhance or reduce the
efficiency of the risk allocation in the economy. Having accomplished this we are in a position
to say that a derivative is socially enhancing or cooperative if it leads to a more efficient
allocation of risk characterized by a higher Aggregate Sharpe ratio.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Our model is presented in Section
2. In Section 3 we introduce our definition of a socially efficient derivative and describe
the properties of a socially efficient allocation. We illustrate in Section 4 its applicability
by means of a qualitative analysis of three kinds of derivatives, namely Plain Vanilla, Asset
Backed Securities and Credit Default Swaps. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model setup
2.1 Portfolio decisions
We begin by considering an economy characterized by a collection of risky investment projects
and a group of individuals i = 1, ..., N endowed with a given amount of initial (equity) capital
Ci. Let ri and σi be, respectively, the gross return per unit of capital and volatility of the
portfolio chosen by agent i (ROI) and let Ii be the amount agent i chooses to invest in the
portfolio of risky assets.
As in standard mean-variance theory, each individual, after having selected the desired
portfolio, decides how much to invest on it or, equivalently, how much leverage his positions
on the basis of his own risk preferences. Hence, each individual chooses the optimal leverage
λ∗ = I∗i /Ci (Ci is considered to be given) which maximizes her utility function. We assume
that each agent has a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function7 with
different absolute risk aversion parameters αi. Assuming for simplicity a zero risk free rate,
6The reader who is unfamiliar with the topic may wish to consult [38] and the excellent selection of
references therein contained.
7Hence a negative exponential utility function U(X) = a− be−αX .
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each individual i then maximizes,
max
λi
λiµi −
αi
2
λ2iσ
2
i . (1)
The first-order-condition for this utility maximization is
µi − αiλiσ
2
i = 0 (2)
so that the optimal leverage for individual i, λ∗i becomes
λ∗i =
µi
αiσ2i
(3)
In practice, however, the true values of the portfolio expected return µi and risk σi are
not known. Let’s call µˆi the estimate made by agent i of the unknown expected return µi
and σˆi the estimates of the unknown risk σi. Hence, the desired leverage can be written as
λ̂∗i =
µˆi
αiσˆ
2
i
= λ∗i
σ2i
σˆ2i
µˆi
µi
= λ∗i ei (4)
where ei − 1 =
σ2
i
σˆ2
i
µˆi
µi
− 1 is the estimation error of the agent i in evaluating the expected
mean and risk of his position.
2.2 Individual default probability and distance to default
We assume that an individual i defaults when the loss on her risky asset position exceeds
her initial capital Ci, which can then be interpreted as the risk capacity of agent i. Thus,
the probability of default of agent i is given by
pi = P (Iiri < −Ci).
Notice that in a Gaussian world with ri ∼ N(µi, σ
2
i ) the return obtained by investing Ii
in such a portfolio is distributed as Iiri ∼ N(Iiµi, I
2
i σ
2
i ). Therefore, denoting with Φ the
distribution function of a standard normal, the true probability of default is P (Iiri < −Ci) =
1−Φ
(
Ci+Iiµi
Iiσi
)
' 1−Φ
(
Ci
Iiσi
)
, i.e. a decreasing function of the so called Distance to Default
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(DD):8
DD∗i =
Ci
Iiσi
= (λi · σi)
−1. (5)
which can be interpreted as the “number of standard deviations a company is away from its
default threshold”.
However, taking into account estimation errors on the determination of the optimal level
of investment and, thus, on the optimal leverage, will affect the volatility of the portfolio
chosen by the individuals. In fact, the variance of the leveraged portfolio per unit of capital
invested, that was λ2iσ
2
i in absence of estimation errors, now is (assuming independence
between estimation errors and returns)
V
[
λˆ∗i ri
]
= V [λ∗i eiri] = λ
∗2
i
(
E[ei]
2σ2i + µ
2
iV [ei] + V [ei]σ
2
i
)
. (6)
Clearly for E[ei] = 1 and V [ei] = 0 we recover the variance of the portfolio with no estimation
errors, while the higher are the mean and variance of the estimation errors the higher will
be the variance of the leveraged portfolio.
Therefore, the individual DD in presence of estimation error becomes:
DDi =
(
λi
√
E[ei]2σ
2
i + µ
2
iV [ei] + V [ei]σ
2
i
)
−1
. (7)
Hence, the DDi’s, and thus the individual probabilities of default, are made of three com-
ponents: the degree of leverage λi, the true riskiness of the portfolio σi, and the statistical
properties of the estimation error ei.
2.3 Systemic Risk
Following the popular measure proposed by [14] we define systemic risk as the sum of the
expected capital shortage over the whole population of financial institutions. Thus, according
8
DD is a convenient measure that emerged as the industry standard for estimating and evaluating the
default risk in credit risk modelling (Moody’s KMV model). Obviously, the larger is DD the smaller is the
probability of default. The DD measure does not include the contribution of the mean of ri being typically
negligible on the short-medium horizon and very difficult to estimate. Moreover, it does not consider the
effects of the higher order moments of the distribution of ri.
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to this prominent literature, systemic risk is measured by the total amount of capital that
the government would have to provide in order to bailout the financial system in case of
distress.
Specifically, in our framework, Systemic Risk (SR) can be defined as
SR ≡
N∑
i=1
ESi
where ESi is the expected (capital) shortfall defined as
ESi = −E [Iiri|Iiri < −Ci]
i.e. the expected loss given the default of the financial institution i (expressed as a positive
value for convenience).
3 Evaluation of the social efficiency of derivatives
3.1 Definition of socially efficient derivatives
Let us denote
Y =
N∑
i=1
Iiri
to be the total gross return of the whole economy. We are now in the position to present
our definition of a socially efficient allocation. We say that an allocation is socially efficient
if, for any given level of E [Y ], it minimizes SR,
minSR subject to E [Y ] = E [Y0] .
Note that this is equivalent to requiring that for any given level of SR, it maximizes the
expected value of E [Y ], i.e.
maxE [Y ] subject to SR = SR0.
Hence, the socially efficient frontier will be a curve in the plane SR–E [Y ] which maximizes
8
Figure 1: A stylized representation of the efficient frontier in the aggregate SR–E [Y ] plane.
E [Y ] for any level of SR or, alternatively, which minimizes SR for any level of E [Y ].
We can now state our definition of a socially efficient derivative: a derivative is said to
be socially efficient or cooperative if it permits to move from an interior and inefficient point
to a superior aggregate risk allocation having a higher “Aggregate Sharp ratio” E [Y ] /SR.
3.2 Properties of a socially efficient allocation
Under normality of the return distribution the expected shortfall, being simply the first
moment of a truncated Normal distribution, can be explicitly written as:9
ESi = −E [Iiri|Iiri < −Ci] = −CiE
[
−λˆ∗i ri|λˆ
∗
i ri < −1
]
= Ci ·DD
−1
i ·M(DDi) (8)
where M(z) is the inverse Mills ratio defined as
M(z) =
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)
. (9)
with φ(z) and Φ(z) being, respectively, the density and distribution function of the standard
normals.
9Again, we are neglecting the contribution of the mean of returns, as it is customary for computations at
short-medium horizons.
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Figure 2: Plot of DD−1i ·M(DDi) as a function of DD
−1
i and its linear fit obtained by standard
OLS (giving intercept 0.7892 and slope 0.7579).
The product DD−1i ·M(DDi) is an increasing function of DD
−1
i and it is virtually linear
in DD−1i , as illustrated in Figure 2. As pointed out in section 2.2, the individual DDi’s, are
made of three components: the degree of leverage λi, the true riskiness of the portfolio σi,
and the statistical properties of the estimation error ei. Therefore, each individual expected
shortfall can be very well described as:
ESi ∝ Ci ·DD
−1
i = Ciλi
√
E[ei]2σ2i + µ
2
iV [ei] + V [ei]σ
2
i . (10)
Thus, the expected shortfall of individual i increases with the degree of leverage λi, with
the true riskiness of the portfolio σi, with the positive bias of the estimation error, i.e. the
underestimation of risk (σˆi < σi ⇒ E[ei] > 1) and the overestimation of the expected return
(µi < µˆi ⇒ E[ei] > 1), and, finally, with the variance of the estimation error V [ei].
Hence, ceteris paribus SR, being the sum of individual expected shortfall, is an increasing
function of the individual values σi and λi. Concerning the estimation error components,
at the aggregate level it seems, in general, reasonable to assume that individual errors are
uncorrelated and hence their estimation errors tend to average out over distinct individuals.
On the other hand, the variance of the estimation error V [e] continues to play an important
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role on systemic risk. In fact, the larger the variance of the estimation error V [e], the larger
the individual expected shortfall, and hence the higher will be the SR of the economy.
Summarizing, an efficient allocation is reached in the economy when: (i) the idiosyncratic
risks of the single projects are optimally diversified (reducing σi’s); (ii) the remaining non–
diversifiable risk is optimally estimated (minimum V [e] and E[e] = 1), (iii) and optimally
shared among the investors according to their risk capacities (minimization of the aggregate
leverage of the economy). This definition of an efficient risk allocation makes also clear that
only those risks which directly or indirectly contribute to elevating E [Y ] should be born by
the society. As they only increase SR, but not E [Y ], the other risks lead to a less efficient
allocation point in the SR–E [Y ] plane.
4 Discussion of specific cases
The theoretical framework developed in the previous sections allows us to identify the various
channels through which a given type of derivative enhances or reduces the efficiency of the
risk allocation according to the Aggregate Sharpe ratio of the economy. In this Section we
present a qualitative analysis of some types of derivatives and show how our framework could
be applied to evaluate different types of derivative contracts. A more detailed quantitative
analysis of the various types of derivatives will be the topic for future, empirically oriented,
work.
4.1 Case 1: Plain vanilla derivatives
The main characteristic of the most standard and simple derivative contracts (such as futures,
plain vanilla options, or swaps) is the possibility to transfer specific types of risks. This
possibility of relocating risks from one subject to another, who is more willing to bear it,
is often considered sufficient to enhance risk allocation and, hence, to be socially beneficial.
However, this depends on whether the final allocation entails a lower systemic risk compared
to the initial one. The reduction of systemic risk, in turn, depends on whether risk is
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transferred to individuals with largerDD, i.e. with either higher risk capacity (lower leverage
λ), better portfolio diversification (lower σi), or better information (smaller estimation error
e). This is particularly unlikely to be the case when risk transfer is motivated by regulatory
arbitrages or moral hazard behaviors.
Moreover, even in many plain vanilla derivatives, it is well possible that none of the
counterparties is transferring a preexisting risk. In this case, since no risk is reallocated,
there cannot be any social efficiency gain coming from a better risk allocation. However,
new risks are created. In fact, although such contracts are zero-sum transactions, they are
certainly not “zero-sum risk”, in the sense that the risk generated by the two-side bets
does not compensate. Hence, even though the risks produced by these speculative bets do
not contribute to E [Y ], they have to either absorb capital diverted from other investments
projects (which instead contribute to Y ) or increase the position leverage of the agents and,
therefore, the systemic risk of the economy. So, even simple and usually beneficial derivatives
products, if misused, can considerably increase systemic risk and thus reduce the Aggregate
Sharpe ratio of the economy.
4.2 Case 2: Asset backed securities
An Asset Backed Security (ABS) is a security whose cash flows are derived from, and col-
letaralized by, a specified pool of receivables or other financial assets. Those underlying
assets are typically represented by illiquid and risky assets which individually possess a very
low rating score. The securitization process precisely consists in pooling various types of
contractual debt (mortgages, loans or credit card debt) and selling those debts to various
investors. Pooling those assets together and slicing such a pool into different risk classes, or
tranches, categorized into varying degrees of subordination, reduces the risk of the so called
“senior” tranches, since these rely on the protection of the junior tranches which would be
the first to suffer the losses in the pool. Through this complex mechanism of pooling and
splitting into different risk classes, the senior tranches were able to achieve AAA-ratings.
Prior to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, this extremely high rating induced many banks and
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other investors to hold large amount of AAA-tranches of a vast variety of ABS products.
As it was apparent after the burst of the crisis, those risk evaluations of ABS were severely
biased, since the products turned out to be much riskier than implied by their credit scores.
Hence, the complex and opaque structure of the ABS and the related Collateralize Debt
Obligations (CDOs) [13] not only increased uncertainty on the level of risk of the underlying
assets, thus increasing the variance of the estimation error e, but also caused a systematical
underestimation of such a risk giving rise to a strong bias in e arose; this in turn led to
an unwarranted rise in leverages which further increased individual risk. The separation
between the subject originating the risk and those bearing it, also gave rise to large scale
moral hazard problems, which greatly increased the size and misspricing of the generated
risks. Moreover, being present in the portfolio of many institutions, ABSs and CDOs highly
increased the correlation among the individual probability of default.10
Therefore, our model suggests that this type of products exposed financial institutions
to more systemic risk through:
(i) an increase in the variance of the estimation error V [e] (lack of transparency);
(ii) a positive bias in e, i.e. E[e] > 1 (misspricing);
(iii) an increase in individual leverages λi (moral hazard) and
(iv) an increase in the correlation of the probability of default which magnify the probability
of contagion.
As a consequence, according to our definition, this type of derivatives were not (in that form)
cooperative or socially efficient: even if E [Y ] might increase, SR is also increased, and the
net change in the position of the economy in the E [Y ] − SR space is not superior to (i.e.
does not dominate) the initial one.
10See [7] accessible yet very informative discussion of the increasing asset correlations and of the intercon-
nectedness of markets (and the world economy).
13
4.3 Case 3: Credit Default Swaps
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a contract in which one party, the protection seller, sells
protection to a second party, the protection buyer, against a credit event of a third party
issuing a debt. In case of a default the protection buyer is compensated for the loss generated
by the failure of the third party. The protection buyer pays, on a regular basis, a premium
to the protection seller usually expressed in percentage points of the notional, the so called
CDS spread. CDS are then simply a form of insurance against default. However, unlike
insurance contracts, CDS do not require an exposure to the underlying credit risk. If the
protection buyer does not hold the underlying security, CDS are said to be naked. Naked
CDS can then be used to build speculative bets on the default of the third party: the naked
protection buyer is betting on default while the other is betting against. The large amount
of volume of the CDS market (in principle even larger than the total debt of the underlying
entity) indicates that a substantial portion of contracts are naked [29, 39].
CDS have come to play an important role in conveying information about the market
consensus on the creditworthiness of the underlying11, especially in cases when the underlying
debt market is not particularly liquid. These price discovery properties of the CDS, if viewed
in the light of our model, translate in a reduction of the variance (and possibly bias) of the
estimation errors e.
Non-naked CDS simply imply transferring credit risk from the protection buyer to the
protection seller, leaving the total amount of credit risk in the economy unaltered. So the
systemic risk implication of this relocation of risk depends on the relative risk capacity of
the protection seller compared to the one of the protection buyer. If the protection seller
has a greater risk capacity (in terms of larger capital, smaller leverage or better diversified
portfolio which results in greater DD) than the protection buyer, systemic risk is reduced,
otherwise it will be increased.
However, in the presence of naked CDS where no risk shifting is involved, the total
11 Empirical studies on how new information is incorporated in bond and CDS prices shows that informa-
tion mainly flows from CDS to bond prices (see [10]).
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amount of counterparty risk in the economy is increased by the two-sided bets on the default
event. These newly created risk are unproductive and need to either absorb risk capacity or
increases the systemic risk. Naked CDS can also encourage investors to divert their capital
away from financing real investment leading in some cases to the selection of riskier ventures
with lower expected returns [15].
Moreover, being the market of CDS highly concentrated in few large protection sellers,
the counterparty risk generated by the default of one of these dominant actors can generate
default contagion and domino effects. In the presence of a large market of naked CDS, the
risk is not only given by the loss generated by the default of the issuer of debt, but also by
the counterparty risk of all the protection sellers who wrote CDS on that entity. In other
words, if CDS protection sellers have insufficient capital to cover CDS losses, the default of
the issuer of the debt also causes the default of protection sellers, hence widening the scope
for contagion and systemic risk [16].
This risk was clearly illustrated by the AIG case during the 2008 crisis which exerted
domino effects through enormous CDS contractual links. In fact, AIG’s collapse was caused
largely by its $526 billion portfolio of CDSs. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has
characterized AIG operations in derivative markets as the behaviour of a “quasi-hedge fund”
that “made irresponsible bets and took huge losses”12.
Therefore, the introduction of CDS have both positive and negative effects on systemic
risk and E [Y ]:
(i) they allow for a better price discovery on the creditworthiness of the issuer so that, in
the notation of our model, V [e] and hence SR is reduced;
(ii) if credit risk is allocated to more capitalized and diversified subjects, it could permit
a better allocation of risk, i.e. either decreasing SR or increasing Y ;
(iii) if, however, CDS transfer credit risk to more leveraged and systemically important
institutions SR will increase;
12David Stout and Brian Knowlton, Fed Chief Says Insurance Giant Acted Irresponsibly, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/business/economy/04webecon.html
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(iv) in addition, CDS can magnify the underlying credit risk by compounding it with the
counterparty risk of the protection sellers, thus increasing the total amount of risk in the
system (without financing more productive projects) and the possibility of contagion
(ρ¯ which elevates P (DN/N > ϑ)).
Therefore, the social efficiency of CDS remains unclear, depending on which of the above
effects eventually dominates. However, some of the negative effects which tend to increase
SR could be mitigated by moving the trading of CDS from the OTC market to a centralized
clearinghouse which would greatly reduce the counterparty risk of CDS.
5 Conclusions
Today, the first and most fundamental problem in risk allocation is to understand the com-
plex effects induced by financial derivatives and how they could be so badly misused to ignite
a global crisis. We argued that part of the answer lies in the relation among individual risk,
systemic risk and the related notions of correctly assessing risk capacity and leverage.
In this paper we put forward a new theoretical framework within which the social effi-
ciency of the risk allocation determined by a given derivative product can be assessed. To
this purpose, we investigate the determinants of the default risk of a single agent identifying
three components: (i) the degree of leverage, (ii) the riskiness of the individual portfolio
and (iii) the estimation error in evaluating the expected return and risk of the portfolio.
Then, after defining systemic risk as the sum of individual expected loss given default, we
introduced an aggregate risk-return plane for the risk allocations and define an Aggregate
Sharpe ratio for the whole economy. Finally, we proposed our criteria to evaluate the social
efficiency of a derivative by looking at whether it increases or reduces the Aggregate Sharpe
ratio of the system.
This approach, albeit simple, permits to take into account many important factors in the
evaluation of the efficiency of a risk allocation: the quality of the diversification achieved
by the individuals, the amount of funding of productive investments, the degree of leverage
16
and, importantly, it brings to the foreground the systemic effects induced by the imprecise
estimation of risk made by the individuals.
Applying this theoretical framework to some of the most controversial derivatives we
can conclude that a generic derivative contract is socially cooperative if : (i) informational
gains are provided by improving transparency and price discovery, (ii) preexisting risks are
reallocated only to more capitalized, diversified or informed subjects, (iii) new risks are not
created.
We believe that our framework may be employed by regulators and supervising authorities
for policy evaluations as well as in the design of future financial reform. In order to fully
explore such a possibility, however, we must bring to completion the empirically oriented
work which is currently under way on this topic.
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